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fire: first, sea; and of sea, half is earth, and half fiery water-spout."
The third fragment is transmitted by Plutarch: "all things are counterparts of fire, and fire of all things, as goods of gold and gold of goods."
Similarly, Maximus of Tyre reports that, according to Heraclitus, "Fire lives the death of the earth, and air lives the death of fire, water lives the death of air, and earth that of water." A fragment of Hippolytus, without expressly naming fire, names lightning, which is probably the same thing: "The thunder-bolt steers all things."
Another passage by the same author, in which it is said that fire will judge all things at the end of the world, was suspected by K. Reinhardt1 of merely being a Stoic and Christian interpretation of the Heraclitean doctrine of fire; but its authenticity has recently been vindicated.2
Turning now to Iran, we will first of all examine the Gathas of Zoroaster. The role of fire in them is fundamental. Twice Zoroaster calls upon "the fire of Ahura Mazda," either to make offerings to it (Y. 43. 9) or to acknowledge its protection (Y. 46. 7). More frequently (in all other passages, to be precise) fire is characterized as an instrument of ordeal. Ordeal is not found in the Gathas as an actual practice, except for one single mention of it (Y. 32. 7), but several times there is reference to a future ordeal which is to be made by means of fire to separate the good from the wicked, and which Zoroaster invokes. Here fire is the instrument of truth or justice (asa), from which it derives its power (hence the epithet asa-aojah). This connection of fire with asa is constant; it appears again in a passage I have mentioned (Y. 43.9) which may be translated: "I wish to think, insofar as I am able, of making unto thy fire (0 Ahura Mazda!) the offering of veneration for asa." In other words, to venerate asa, offerings are made to the fire of the Lord. In the same way, when each of the elements or each of the categories of beings of the universe are placed under the protection of one of the Entities which surround Ahura Mazda, asa is the patron of Fire. Now the question arises: Could this doctrine of the Gathas have been known to Heraclitus? Neither the date nor the place of Zoroaster's reform are known with certainty, but it is probable that it occurred at the beginning of the sixth century B.C., in northeastern Iran. We do not know what of it may have reached the western part of the Persian Empire at the time of the early Greek philosophers, when the cities of Ionia bordered on this empire and then were incorporated into it.
What we do know is that Darius worshipped Ahura Mazda, standing before the altar of fire.
On the other hand, in a fifth-century relief found at Dascylium (capital of a satrapy of Asia Minor on the sea of Marmara), we see two Magi with their mouths covered by a veil, as is the custom to this day among Parsee priests during the sacrifice, and holding the ritual twigs. Below them are the heads of a bull and a ram, ostensibly intended for the sacrifice. In front of them there is a column surmounted by a sort of abacus or table, possibly a fire altar. Here is the idea which Heraclitus may have had of the Magi who, besides, are mentioned in one of his fragments that have remained, but placed promiscuously along with the "noctambules, Bacchants, Maenads, initiates" whom he accuses of impiety.
But what could he have known of the doctrines of the Magi, and especially of their fire doctrine? To answer this question we must extend our Iranian inquiry, searching elsewhere than in the Gathas of the prophet, which at that time were perhaps still unknown in Asia Minor.
In medieval Iran, and already partly in the Avesta-and we shall see that these ideas are probably even more ancient-various species of fire are distinguished, and there are three ways of classifying fires.
First of all, in contrast to the normal fires, Adardn, there was the fire Varhrdn. The fire Varhrdn, preserved in the temples of the first magnitude and importance, is treated like a king; a crown is suspended above it. Many Pahlavi texts call him "the king of fires." The ceremony of his installation is called enthronement.
There is a second classification: in a certain sense, it completes the first, because it concerns three fires, called Farnbdg, GuSnasp and Burzen-Mihr, patrons, respectively, of the three social classes-priests, warriors, farmers-so that, by adding the fire Varhran to them, we have the entire society.
The two classifications considered so far concern only the ritual fires. There is also a third classification, which seems more general, in which a physical theory is reflected, and which consequently allows us to set it in relation to the early philosophers of Ionia, of whom Heraclitus was one.
This classification (found in the Avesta, Y. 17. 11, and in the BundahiAn, chap. xviii) distinguishes five fires with their respective definitions: 37 1. Barazisavah, which shines before the Lord; 2. Vohufryana, which is found in the body of men and of animals; 3. Urvdzista, which is found in plants; 4. Vazista, which fights against Spanjagrya among the clouds; 5. Spanista, which is used for work. This classification presupposes a physical doctrine of the universal presence of fire. But for the moment we must pass over the first and the last: we may observe that the other three form a system; for (reading from the bottom up) the fire of lightning (that which fights with Spanjagrya, demon of the storm, among the clouds) brings on the rain which nourishes plants, from which we can get this fire by rubbing together two pieces of wood, and the plants nourish the animals and men in whom fire becomes vital heat.
It would seem that a confusion arose between the first and the fifth fire, since sp5nista (the name of the fifth fire) means, despite the definition given it, "the most sacred," which, rather, corresponds to the definition of the first fire: "which shines before the Lord."
In any case, the doctrine of vital and cosmic fire is very ancient, although it has been modified in the course of time. So it is, in fact, not by chance that India, especially in the Chandogya-Upanisad, is acquainted, just like Iran, with a classification of fires into three types, and one into five types, and that the three fires of the former classification are, as in Iran, ritual or sacrificial fires, and-what is even more important-that these correspond identically to the three Iranian fires and social classes:
Ahdvaniya-Priests-fire of the oblation to the gods Anvdhdrya-Warriors-fire which wards off demons Garhapatya-Farmers-domestic fire The comparison was made by Dum6zil3 and illustrates yet again the tripartite ideology of the Indo-Europeans which this scholar has so often pointed out.
The other Indian classification, that distinguishing and defining five fires, is the one which concerns us most here: we readily observe in it a doctrine of vital and cosmic fire similar to that of Iran; these are the names and characteristics of these fires: asau lokah, the heavenly world, whence Soma is born parjanyah, the storm, the tempest, whence rain is born prthivi, the earth, whence nourishment puruqah, man, from whom sperm yoqd, woman, from whom the embryo It is clear that at the base of such a classification lies a primitive theory of the fiery nature of the vital fluid or sap which runs through the entire scale of beings. And here is undoubtedly still another reflection, which is very ancient, of the same theory: Apam Napat, a deity certainly Indo-Iranian in date, and whose name literally means "grandson of the waters," is called in the Avesta (Yt. 19. 52) "the god who created men (males), who fashioned men." Why specifically males, if not as the repositories of the fluid which transmits life and which originates in lightning?
The Iranian fire rituals permit us, in the same way, to make two other interesting deductions. The fire Varhrdn is made up of a number of different fires, brought together and ritually purified. Now one of these fires comes from lightning.
On the other hand, it is forbidden to let the rays of the sun fall on the sacred fire: for the fire of the altar itself symbolizes the sun; or rather, it is in a certain way the sun, before which the other sun must disappear.
And now it is time to conclude on this first point. In the IndoIranian religion, and afterward in the most ancient religion of Iran, it seems that there existed a rudimentary fire-cosmology. Heraclitus may have heard of it. Certainly his acquaintance with the Milesians and Hippasus would have been sufficient for him to have some information on such a system of physics. But it is not unlikely that it was due to the suggestiveness of the doctrines of the Magi that he chose, among the various kinds of physics which were widespread from Thales on, one which assigned the basic function to fire.
In the Indo-Iranian doctrine, then, fire was a life-giving, seminal substance-Heraclitus' rvip aei S4ov. At the end of all things, it would judge the world. In a more general way it was associated with the truth, to which we shall now turn, examining first the Logos in Heraclitus, then the Indo-Iranian notion of Rta-Asa.
The answers to both problems seem to oscillate between two extremes; and on both sides it has been bedeviled by very peculiar circumstances. I think, though, that with a certain amount of good sense the right answer, in both cases, is in sight.
On Heraclitus we have a volume in Zeller's Philosophie der Griechen, which has recently undergone a thorough revision at the hands of the Italian scholar Mondolfo. It has doubled in bulk.
The book, although it is generally up to date, unfortunately does not mention a thesis which is of capital importance, a thesis published at Nijmegen in the Netherlands, by Surig, "De betekenis van Logos in Heraclitus" (1951) .
Surig attacks with a novel argument, drawn from Plato, the extreme view (inherited as we shall see from the Stoic and Christian tradition) that the Logos is a Cosmic principle that rules the world-39 in other words, a kind of God. Did Heraclitus understand and teach that the Logos is a unique substance, the supreme, active principle which directs the universe?
Such was the way that the Stoics conceived of the Logos. For them the Logos was identical with the Fire that rules the world. Coming after Plato and Aristotle, they claimed to abolish the distinction between spirit and matter which Plato had taught. They were, however, in line with the Timaeus, conceiving the universe as a living being, but they owed a great deal also in this respect to medicine (and perhaps because of this, to the East-but that is another question). The universe was, then, a living being whose soul, igneous breath diffused through all things, held the parts together. On account of this conception, seeing that it annulled Plato in part, the Stoics claimed to follow Heraclitus whose view they perhaps deformed, as we shall try to see.
The same thing happened later among the Christians. In the Christian Logos the Stoic logos survives until our time, blended with the Semitic conception of the word of God. God's creative word, the Fiat Lux of Genesis, came to be hypostatized, personified in the manner in which it was represented in Egypt, Sumer, and Babylonia, as a distinct being. Egypt used to figure it concretely as a little man issuing forth from the mouth of the god whose will he expressed, whose orders he In short, it would seem that Heraclitus was conscious of the synonymy of all these terms, and thus conceived of the logos as a distinct substance, the active principle and ruler of the world. Thus, the Christians-still today-would with good reason recognize in the thinker of Ephesus a prophet of their God.4
But as Surig has shown, there is a difficulty in this: If Heraclitus had already had this conception, if he had already put the Logos there where Plato was to put the Good, Aristotle the Immovable Mover, and the Christians God, how is it that Plato said nothing of it, nor did Aristotle, although they knew the work of Heraclitus very well (and not only the fragments of it which remain for us) and although Plato mentioned a similar attempt, that of Anaxagoras, who put the Nous at the head of all things? But no, they do not report anything like that of Heraclitus. However, the term "logos" is among those which they employ, either with respect to Heraclitus or otherwise, but never in the sense of an active principle and director of the world. For them (as Surig has shown), the logos of Heraclitus is his doctrine, and this doctrine exhausts itself in three points: the general flow of things, the equivalence of the one and the all, and the harmony of opposites.
It is not, let us repeat, because of lack of interest in the notion of the logos: much to the contrary, this notion was adopted by Plato and Aristotle, and if they developed it, it was in senses altogether different from those which the Stoics gave it and attributed to Heraclitus. Moreover, Plato (or Socrates) even endeavored to defend the positions of Heraclitus concerning the logos against the deformations made by the philosophers-Sophists and Heracliteans-who claimed to follow him. Against the Sophists he maintained that the logos is not only a means of combat, but that there is a logos in reality: against the Heracliteans, who saw (or looked for) the truth in words, he maintained that truth is only in the logos, that is to say, in the sentence or judgment. But finally (in his Letters) he went beyond the Logos, in posing, as the supreme degree to which knowledge can reach, above words, the ideas.
As for Aristotle-who knew the text of Heraclitus to the point of being able to discuss the place of a comma in it (before or after adl, First Fragment)-he maintained, in line with his predecessors, Heraclitus and Plato, that only in judgment is there truth. And he went beyond the logos as judgment in discovering the purely formal mechanism of the syllogism.
It is then evident that, for Plato, the logos belongs to the sphere of epistemology, and for Aristotle, to the sphere of logic. Neither of them made a metaphysical, ontological being of it. Shall we therefore conclude that they failed to see that this value of the logos already existed in the thought of the obscure Ephesian?
Or shall we, with Surig, go to the other extreme and say that to Heraclitus, the Logos was simply his teaching: When he said that things happen according to the logos he meant "according to the doctrine he had been teaching, namely that of incessant flux, equivalence of one and all, union of opposites"?
More than a quarter-century ago, E. Hoffmann put in relief the fact, until then unrecognized, that the logos is an act of speech, a discourse.5 But this logos does not simply exist in Heraclitus' mind. It has, according to his own statements, an objective reality. On the basis of Hoffmann's study, but also of some reservations formulated with respect to it by Calogero (another Italian scholar), Pagliaro (an Iranist, by the way) was able to specify6 that the Logos, as it appears in the First Fragment, has two aspects, the one verbal, the e"rea, the other real, the 'p-ya, and that there is no opposition between these two aspects, as Hoffmann maintained but, on the contrary, it is precisely their union, their reciprocal correspondence, which constitutes the logos. In other words, the logos, the true discourse, exists not only in language but in things as well: It is the agreement of the sentence with what it represents. Now, can this truth, which is in the sentence, be already in the word? Yes, on the condition that this word, like reality, combines opposites: thus PLos signifies life or, the opposite of life: the bow which kills.
But if the word is univocal, thus avo3os, it is necessary to associate with it its opposite, KatOoos, in order to express the reality.
The logos is, then, the form according to which all things take place: It is the norm of each thing; for example, the soul, the y4vxj, has a logos.
But did Heraclitus go further? One might perhaps adduce on the logos as a substance the testimony of Sextus Empiricus who said:
It is then by drawing in by inspiration this divine logos that, according to Heraclitus, we become intelligent, and while forgetful during sleep, become sensible again on waking. For during sleep, as the passages of the senses are closed, the mind within us is cut off from its natural union with the enveloping substance-only the connection by way of respiration, like that of a root, being preserved-and being thus parted it loses the power of memory which it previously possessed, etc.
It is, of course, only too easy to dismiss this testimony as a late, rather coarse interpretation of Heraclitus' doctrine. We might cite a fragment in support of it, but on condition that we take r aor6pov as a synonym of logos-which is by no means certain: Of all those whose discourse I have heard, none arrives at the realization that that which is wise is set apart from all things (Frag. 108).
Be that as it may, we must admit that the logos was not for Heraclitus an active, directing principle; otherwise, Plato and Aristotle would have said so.
On the other hand, Heraclitus' logos was not purely epistemological or logical, for such a distinction had not yet been recognized by the old Ephesian sage. I mean that the notion of a purely abstract principle was yet to be born. We may safely conclude, then, that the logos was at once mental and substantial but not active. It was the objective truth, according to which all things happen.
Let us now turn to India and Iran. In the Veda, Rta plays a conspicuous part. What did it mean exactly? Ever since the Petersburg Dictionary appeared, whose opinion was taken over notably by Bergaigne and Oldenberg, it has been customary to see in the rta not only truth (rtdm vad means "to tell the truth") but the order of things, be it in nature, in the liturgy, or in the moral conduct. It could be inferred that the Indo-Iranians had conceived of a sort of great cosmic law, controlling both the course of the heavenly bodies and the behavior of men.
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Against this interpretation Liiders protested in 1910. He maintained that the Vedic authors did not have the notion of a universal order. Rta is merely the truth, the non-lie.
Unfortunately Liiders died before publishing the full demonstration for which he had been amassing material for thirty years. And this is one of the unfortunate circumstances to which I alluded: his manuscript, retrieved in a rather bad shape from a shelter in Germany, was published only in 1951-60 (2 volumes), and the book was therefore largely obsolete when it appeared. It is a pity that Liders was unable not only to take the recent literature into account, but also to take part in the discussion which the publication of his book seems to have revived.
Liiders obstinately maintains that the only possible translation of rta is truth, Wahrheit-a translation which can only be upheld by stretching the meaning of the German or English term so as to include notions which are not usually part of it-such as "cosmic power."
Why then stick to Wahrheit? Why this obstinacy? The reason is, I think, because Liiders thought (perhaps rightly) that he had discovered in Wahrheit the original meaning of the word.
If the rta, he said in substance, is supposed to influence the course of the stars and human conduct, ritual or otherwise, it is by virtue of the magical power of the true utterance, of the exact formula uttered in the cult. The ceremony which brings this power into play is well known, although its name is not attested in Sanskrit: it is the saccakiriyd of the Pali texts. In order to obtain the favor of a god, one pronounces a truth (not necessarily a reminder of a former favor of this god), and this secures success.
Liiders shows that this ceremony is already Vedic and even more ancient. It enables us to understand the mythical role which rta plays in many passages of the Veda: by rta (or by brahman, or by vac "voice," etc.) has been opened the Vala, the cavern from which come the waters and the light; it is by rta, by pronouncing the rta, that the eclipse of the sun has been conquered: and rta is the instrument of the Rbhus in their thousand miraculous exploits.
Liiders' analyses have had at least one positive result, by showing the magic origin of the cosmic value given the rta. But Liiders thought he had discovered in the Veda this process by which a mere utterance from the mouth of men becomes a force in the universe. It is more difficult to follow him here, for we do not witness the process developing in the Veda; we see only the result of it.
As Gonda has shown in his review of Liiders' book published in Meanwhile a certain parallelism may already have become noticeable between the Rta-ASa problem and that posed by the logos in Heraclitus. And on both sides we find in the last analysis a notion which is neither purely objective nor purely abstract, but both at once.
But there is more to come. As Liiders again has shown, in a large number of passages rta is synonymous with brahman, that is to say, with "hymn," with "Kultlied." One can deduce from this, as well as from passages in which rta means "truth," the meaning, at once general and precise, of rta as "any true statement about God, his powers and his exploits" (jede wahre Aussage iiber den Gott, seine Krdfte und Taten). What is more important is to ascertain-which Liiders has not done, but which will be useful for us-that this cosmic power which is rta is rarely the subject of a sentence: almost always, it is in a case other than the nominative, and most often it is in the instrumental. The world has been created "by means of rta," it is regulated "by means of rta" (rtena).
Returning to Liiders, we make, with him this time, another interesting statement. Rta, cosmic power, is localized and materialized. Often, under the name of "great rta," it is placed in the supreme heaven, with Agni (fire) in the celestial waters from which arise the sun and the dawn each morning, and where soma, the sacred liquor, also resides. This supreme heaven is also the world of sikrta, that is, the Paradise where men enjoy the recompense of their good actions.
It is from the supreme heaven that the inspiration of the sacred poet comes, and that is why (as Paul Thieme, a disciple of Liiders, has shown in ZDMG 102, p. 112) one reads: prd brdhmaitu sddandd rtdsya: "may prayer (brahman) rise from the abode of rta" (RV VII. 36). In other passages it is rta itself which "inspires" the priest and this is expressed concretely, either by the root svas "to breathe" (rtdm dausdndh "those who breathe rta," etc.), or by the root vat (apy avivatann rtdm, "they have insufflated the gift of the word, the rta"), and we must remark, with Thieme and Renou, that "the idea is always that of insufflating a spiritual force into the soul of the poet" and that "it cannot be chance if an old name for the inspired poet, lat. vates, covers exactly this rg-vedic root." 45 
